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EXPECTATION AND THE EARLY PROBABILISTS 
BY EDDIE SHOESMITH 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE AT BUCKINGHAM, 
BUCKINGHAM, ENGLAND 
In an earlier issue of this journal, Daston [1980] dis- 
cussed the role of the "expectation" concept in early proba- 
bility theory. With respect to late-17th-century work, she 
stressed the seminal influence of Huygens' De ratiociniis in 
aleae ludo [1657]. No explicit indication was given of the 
contribution of Pascal and Fermat to the development of expec- 
tation-based concepts and methods, though in a later paper con- 
cerned mainly with the 18th and 19th centuries, Daston sug.- 
gested that "Pascal, Fermat, and Huygens . . . took the legal 
notion of equal expectation, rather than probability per se, 
as their point of departure" [Daston 1981, 2881. I should 
like to complement Daston's interpretation of the 1650s by 
pointing out and briefly commenting on three recent accounts 
[Hacking 1975, Chap. 11; Freudenthal 1980; Edwards 19821 which 
throw some light on the contributions made by Huygens, Pascal 
and Fermat to the emerging concept of "mathematical expecta- 
tion." 
In Chapter 11 of The Emergence of Probability, Hacking 
[1975] discussed in detail Huygens' use of the "expectation" 
concept in De ratiociniis in aleae ludo. Huygens' approach to 
deriving and proving rules of chance was squarely based on the 
notion of a fair bet or fair lottery, as also noted by Daston 
[1980, 2391. Hacking [1975, 951 pointed out further that 
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Huygens took symmetry as his "primitive and undefined notion." 
He then developed this notion, to derive rules for valuing 
bets, by constructing equivalent gambles [Hacking 1975, 961, 
in which all chances and exchanges of money were manifestly 
symmetrical among players. The rules he came up with implied 
that the value of a bet is equal to what we now call the mathe- 
matical expectation of the player's winnings. However, Hacking 
posited that "expectation" was not an established and widely 
understood concept. 
There was no ready-made concept conveniently labelled 
'expectation' whose use Huygens wanted to justify . . . 
Huygens was not trying to justify expectation; he was 
trying to justify a method for pricing gambles which 
happens to be the same as what we call mathematical 
expectation. [Hacking 1975, 951 
This interpretation is strengthened by a brief but enlight- 
ening commentary on Huygens' work by Freudenthal [1980], based 
on the original Dutch text of De ratiociniis in aleae ludo. 
Freudenthal made clear that in van Schooten's Latin translation 
of Huygen's work, expectatio refers to the whole set of possible 
outcome values in a game (the payoff table), whereas our modern 
concept of expectation or expected value was referred to by 
other phrases: in rough translation, "the value of the chance" 
or "the value of the expectation." Freudenthal [1980, 1141 
commented that, in respect to existing accounts of Huygens' use 
of "expectation," "it is my feeling that there is no clear 
idea about what 'expectation' meant to Huygens and how he pro- 
ceeded in details." 
Hacking, like Daston, was brief when referring to the 
Pascal/Fermat correspondence in relation to "expectation." 
Because of Pascal's later work on combinatorial mathematics, 
it is possible to overlook that one of the methods suggested 
by Pascal, in his correspondence with Fermat, for solving the 
"Problem of Points" was based on the manipulation of (what we 
now call) expectations, rather than on odds ratios. A clear 
account of this method is given in Edwards [1982]. Pascal used 
an argument involving equivalent gambles, expressed rather dif- 
ferently from those of Huygens, to find the "value of the 
chance" in a situation where winning gains X, losing gains Y, 
with X > Y. Pascal reexpressed this gamble as a sum of two 
components: a sure thing, or certainty, with value Y; and a 
gamble with possible payoffs of zero and (X - Y). [Edwards 
19821 contains an exposition of how this reasoning was applied 
recursively in the Problem of Points. Pascal suggested this 
method of solution apparently because he considered it a more 
elegant and less tedious method than enumeration of all the 
remaining possibilities for completing the game. 
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SIXTH-CENTURY INTUITIVE PROBABILITY: THE 
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A MIRACLE 
BY JENS H#YRUP 
ROSKILDE UNIVERSITY CENTER, 
DK-4000 ROSKILDE, DENMARK 
Recently, a number of works have been devoted solely or in 
part to tracing "precursors" of probabilistic reasoning, in- 
cluding [Rabinovitch 1973; Hacking 1975; Garber & Zabell 1979; 
Schneider 1977, 19811. Thus far, one very early instance of 
such reasoning seems to have escaped notice. Both because of 
its age and, especially, because of its specific mode of reason- 
ing, it might prove worth investigating. 
In Book IV, Chapter 48, of the History of the Franks, 
Gregory of Tours relates the looting of the monastery of Latte. 
In Thorpe's translation the report runs as follows: 
A force of hostile troops approached and prepared to 
cross the river. [...I "This is the monastery of 
Saint Martin!" cried the monks. "You Francs must not 
cross over here?" Most of those who heard this were 
filled with the fear of God and so withdrew. Twenty 
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